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1. In the current slowdown in Europe, the United 
States and Japan, policy makers are vexed by the 
question when a recovery will come. This is 
the wrong question. The issue should be how a 
higher growth path can be reached in the long 
run, i.e., how the potential growth rate of our 
economies can be increased from the supply side. 
The answer to this question seems to be dif-
ferent for the three most important regions of the 
world economy, the United States, Japan, and 
Europe. All three regions had quite diverging 
growth performance in the nineties. The United 
States reached an annual growth rate of 3.7 per-
cent in the nineties (Table 1); with its “new econ-
omy” and some exuberance, its growth rate of 
4  ½ percent was unusually high for a mature 
economy in the second half of the nineties. Japan 
more or less stagnated during the nineties while 
digesting the fallout of its burst financial bubble 
of 1989. It was a lost decade for Japan. Europe 
exhibited a low growth rate of around 2.1 percent 
in the nineties (and 2.9 percent in the second part 
of the nineties). Capital formation there was low 
relative to the United States; the rate of capital 
formation was at one-third the U.S. rate in the 
nineties. The increase in employment was also 
low.  
Table 1:  Economic Activity in Industrial Countries, 
1992–2000a 
 United  States  EU 
GDP 3.7  2.1 
Gross fixed capital formation  7.3  2.4 
Employment 1.6  0.5 
aAverage percentage rates of growth.     
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, and U.S. 
Department of Labor according to Thomson Financial 
Datastream. 
____________________ 
∗ President of the Kiel Institute of World Economics and 
member of the German Council of Economic Advisers. 
Paper prepared for the first meeting of the Group of Eco-
nomic Analysis of the European Commission (GEA) on 
December 6, 2001. I appreciate critical comments from 
Henning Klodt, Rolf Langhammer, Oliver Lorz, Joachim 
Scheide, Jens Weidmann, and the participants at the GEA 
meeting. 
It can be expected that the United States will 
return to a higher growth rate after the current 
slowdown but with the rate being somewhat 
lower than in the second part of the nineties. 
Japan will get out of stagnation. The EU can be 
expected to continue on a low growth path of 
around 2 percent or a little higher. Thus, the de-
cisive question is how the EU can get on a sig-
nificantly higher growth path with rates of, say, 
3 percent plus x.  
The Strategic Variables for Growth 
2. How can continental Europe get on a higher 
growth path? What are the most important ingre-
dients of a growth process? What factors stimu-
late economic dynamics?  
•  It is technical progress, that is, new products, 
new production processes, and organizational 
change. 
•  It is human capital formation, which may very 
well be the most important growth determinant 
in the information society.  
•  It is capital accumulation, physical capital, new 
machines, and new hardware.  
•  It is doing away with existing growth impedi-
ments, inefficiencies, and institutional arrange-
ments that reduce the production potential. Most 
crucial is the inflexibility of the labor markets in 
the major continental countries. Likewise crucial 
is openness to competition (both internal and 
external) as an efficiency whip.  
If we want to develop a growth strategy, we 
have to answer the question: How can we stimu-
late these growth factors? How can we create an 
environment that is conducive for them? And 
how can we remove growth impediments?  
Note that to investigate growth factors is not 
to investigate the question of convergence, i.e., 
the catching-up-process. Convergence means to 
approach the level of economic prosperity in the 
economically leading countries; this is not the 
relevant question for the core of Europe. The 4 
question for Europe must be how to become a 
growth engine in its own right.  
Create an Environment Conducive for the 
Growth Factors 
3. We have to create an economic environment 
in which inventions, innovation, and investment 
flourish. We have to enhance technological 
change as a process endogenous to an economy.  
An important element is the entrepreneur, the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who takes on risk 
and who daringly implements new combinations 
of factors of production. For growth you need the 
entrepreneur. And we need more of them in 
Europe.  
There must also be a preparedness in the 
European societies to take risks including tech-
nological risks, in areas such as atomic energy 
and biotechnology. Moreover, higher economic 
risks should be accepted. This, however, implies 
that the reward for taking these risks should not 
be called into question. This means accepting 
differences in income.  
In essence, innovation is achieved by recom-
bining existing ideas in a new manner. As the 
potential for new recombinations is higher in 
diverse societies, rising diversity could promote 
innovative dynamics. We should therefore be 
prepared to accept higher diversity. Across coun-
tries, Europe exhibits quite a high degree of 
diversity—not only in income levels, but also in 
social and cultural attitudes. Within countries, 
however, diversity is much lower than, say, in 
the United States. With a deeper integration of 
European capital and labor markets, diversity 
could probably be much better harnessed to gain 
new momentum in the innovation process.1 
The innovative dynamics of an economy are 
no longer solely determined by its efforts in in-
dustrial R&D. Europe is not industry-based any 
more, but service-based and knowledge-based. 
Innovation policy has not yet followed these 
____________________
1  In this view, the envisaged Eastern enlargement could 
well turn out to be a stimulus to innovation also in the in-
cumbent countries, as it will foster the flow of capital, 
people, and ideas in both directions. 
fundamental shifts and still sticks too much to 
traditional innovation concepts and support 
schemes. Successful innovation in new technol-
ogy fields—such as e-business or biotechnol-
ogy—depends much more on open markets and 
favorable conditions for technology-intensive 
start-ups than on conventional R&D subsidies. 
Innovation policy at the EU level and at the 
national level as well certainly needs a funda-
mental redesign. It should be less concerned with 
distributing public funds and more concerned 
with removing market barriers to innovative 
activities. 
Ease of market entry is a key prerequisite for 
economic dynamics both in newly emerging and 
in traditional industries. Most relevant is market 
entry regulation in the new technological areas of 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, communications, 
and information. Regulations to obtain a business 
permit, to build a factory or construct a new 
building, and to license a new product define 
market entry. Market exit regulations affect mar-
ket entry as well. The Internet and the new econ-
omy should not be confronted with too narrow 
regulations. Another prerequisite is access to 
capital in the venture capital market, bypassing 
the traditional ties to banks as the only financial 
intermediaries.  
We should open up our product markets to 
competition where this has not yet been done and 
deregulate them where regulation is no longer 
justified. Quite a bit has been achieved in Europe 
in this respect. In some areas, however, com-
petition is still lacking, especially in some net-
work industries (energy, gas, water, and parts of 
communications) and previously public enter-
prises like the postal service. Protected areas are 
equivalent to a tax on downstream industries and 
activities.  
We should not introduce new forms of internal 
protection against competition, neither through 
new regulation nor through subsidies.  
A continuous flow of inventions and innova-
tions cannot be generated by the national govern-
ments or the European Commission. Starting 
from a Hayekian view of technological progress, 
the flow of new technologies must come from a 
decentralized process. The role of governments 5 
is to co-finance basic research and to ease the 
diffusion of new technical knowledge. National 
governments and the EU should refrain from 
attempting to “make” or “steer” the strategic sec-
tors.  
For a strong endogenous process of tech-
nological change, a tax system is required that 
induces firms to innovate and to build capital and 
that does not slow down and restrict effort. A 
central aspect is entrepreneurial effort. A precon-
dition for reducing taxes and contributions to 
social security is to redefine the role of the state 
and bring down the share of government activi-
ties from 50 percent of GDP in the continental 
countries to a lower value.  
Locational and institutional competition is an 
important vehicle with which to bring forth 
strong economies, to force firms to use their 
imagination to cut costs and to find new pro-
ducts. Competition will prove to be a discovery 
process that points out more efficient solutions. It 
will make an economy strong and robust in the 
long run. Competition policy and antitrust policy 
are necessary ingredients to prevent distortions in 
the competitive process.  
4. With human capital being a major deter-
minant of economic growth, we should improve 
the national systems for human capital forma-
tion. The tax system should not disfavor human 
capital accumulation relative to the accumulation 
of physical capital. It is not sufficient to reduce 
taxes for firms; the high marginal and average 
tax and mandatory contribution rates to the social 
security systems (of 60 percent and more in quite 
a few countries) that workers have to pay must 
also come down.  
In quite a few European countries, contribu-
tions to finance the social security systems imply 
high (average and marginal) tax and contribution 
rates on labor income. Contributions to social 
security systems in the Continental countries are 
already running up to 15–20 percent of GDP, 
whereas they account for 7 percent in the United 
States and 6 percent in the United Kingdom. 
This poses a high tax wedge and a disincentive 
for human capital formation (as well as effort). 
Necessary steps to change this are: to insure 
people only against the large risks that they can-
not cover themselves by a mandatory insurance 
and to let them decide whether they want addi-
tional private insurance for the smaller risks; to 
partly replace the pay-as-you go system by a 
capital funded system for old age in order to 
increase the return for the working generation; 
and to bring mandatory insurance premia and 
benefits more in line with each other by un-
coupling the financing of social security from the 
work contract, thereby reducing or eliminating 
distributional elements. 
Restructuring the social security systems is 
also necessary because the contributions affect 
employment and unemployment. For workers, 
the wedge between the gross wage and the net 
wage makes it harder to accept lower wage in-
creases in wage negotiations. However, they 
have a choice between a net wage and the social 
wage, i.e., benefits paid by the social security 
system. If the sum of the net wage and the con-
tributions to the social security system (“social 
wage”) exceeds productivity, jobs will be re-
duced. In that sense, rising contributions imply a 
tendency to reduce employment and have an in-
cidence similar to a tax on labor.2 Firms react to 
these costs with lower employment, so that labor 
bears the burden of the system in terms of higher 
unemployment. Last but not least, the aging 
population will require the social systems to be 
adjusted and be made sustainable. 
5. The organizational conditions for human 
capital formation are an important key in a strate-
gy for growth. We should make sure that each 
country has an efficient primary and secondary 
school system. Vocational training systems com-
bining formal schooling and on-the-job training 
for the young, such as in Germany, represent a 
promising approach, but they must be more in-
novative with respect to new job opportunities, 
for instance, in the information and communi-
cations industry.  
____________________
2 In a more formal analysis, an implicit tax on labor is given 
if contributions exceed benefits (no marginal equivalence). 
In such an approach, the rise in the marginal and average 
contribution rates in the last decades indicates there has 
been an increase in the implicit tax on labor. 6 
6. The future academic elite of the world is 
overwhelmingly being educated in the United 
States. The university system in some major 
European countries, for instance, in Germany, is 
inflexible and rigid, being steered by administra-
tive procedures, nearly like in central planning. 
Open this system to competition. Let universities 
compete for the best researchers and students and 
let students compete for the best universities. 
Make sure you use all the talents available in a 
society and keep the educational system open to 
all talents.  
Keep Monetary Conditions Stable 
7. Monetary policy can best serve a growth 
strategy by providing a stable money in the long 
run. At the same time, it has to provide sufficient 
liquidity such that the demand side is not 
restricted and can go along with the increase in 
the production potential. Monetary policy must 
be aware of the time lag involved between the 
current money supply and the price level more 
than a year down the road. A more traditional 
failure of monetary policy is that short-run stim-
ulation and excessive liquidity require a stabil-
ization recession at some time in the future 
because otherwise price level stability cannot 
be obtained.3 A more recent and a new form of 
monetary failure is that excessive liquidity can 
create a bubble without affecting price level 
stability. The example of the burst Japanese 
bubble and its aftermath in the nineties show this 
new risk of failure for monetary policy and the 
severe negative implications for growth that can 
follow from excessive liquidity. Greenspan’s story 
and the Fed’s impact on financial exuberance may 
still have to be rewritten.  
Do Away with the Impediments to Growth  
8. Besides setting free these factors of growth, 
impediments of growth have to be abolished. The 
most important impediment is the rigidity of the 
____________________
3 Compare the United States in 1981. 
labor markets in the major Continental countries. 
We should undo this rigidity. The institutions 
that we have developed for the labor market in 
most European countries malfunction. Unem-
ployment ratchets upwards in each recession, and 
jobs are not coming back to the same extent 
when the economy is doing better; hysteresis 
follows. External shocks hit European workers 
harder and more permanently than workers in 
other regions of the world. This requires redoing 
the institutional set-up of the labor market in the 
European countries. Since the institutional ar-
rangements are national (and should remain so), 
redoing the labor market is a national task; the 
EU may help in stimulating a process of inter-
national competition to find the best solution.4  
The rigidity mentioned above does not refer to 
working time (where some flexibility has been 
obtained), but rather to wages. The major con-
tinental countries exhibit a relatively low degree 
of wage differentiation. Differentiated wages, 
however, are needed because of varying job quali-
fications, varying regional situations, and varying 
conditions in the firms. Efficient labor contracts 
comprise three variables: wages, working time, 
and employment guarantees. Such contracts are 
Pareto-efficient, and both the firm and the work-
er  can benefit from them. Since employment 
guarantees cannot be given by centralized em-
ployers’ associations, these contracts have to be 
made in a decentralized way, that is, in the firms. 
We therefore have to look for institutional forms 
which allow these decentralized contracts.  
Since the market does not seem to be a politi-
cally acceptable form of wage formation in the 
Continental countries, we have to look for insti-
tutional mechanisms that allow efficient labor 
contracts including some aspect of job security. 
A first approach is to adjust individual working 
time when there is a slowdown of economic ac-
tivity (and to adjust labor income along with ad-
justments in working time, though not propor-
tionally). This would secure jobs and allow 
working time to “breathe” with the level of activ-
____________________
4 It is important to note that the answer to solving the un-
employment problem may very well differ from country to 
country. 7 
ity (for instance, through annual or even lifelong 
budgets of working hours). A second approach is 
a bonus system with salaries that are part fixed 
and part flexible. A third approach is to introduce 
a two-tier wage bargaining system where job 
security, an important aspect of the wage con-
tract, is dealt with on the firm level (“efficient 
labor contracts” including wages, working time, 
and job security as important variables).  
Although the institutional set-ups differ be-
tween countries, the institutional arrangement is 
generally in favor of insiders; it discriminates 
against the outsiders, the jobless. Make sure that 
all legal rules that disfavor the jobless are 
changed. Abolish all market entry barriers for the 
jobless. Do not protect wages negotiated cen-
trally or at the sector level when they imply that 
jobs will be lost and that new jobs will not be 
created. Allow deviations from negotiated wages 
when this creates jobs or saves jobs. Puncture the 
walls of the wage cartel. Shift wage formation to 
the firms and to the markets. Allow decentralized 
solutions at the firm level in sector-level wage 
bargaining. Give up central wage bargaining.  
Give up the concept of the minimum wage 
because if minimum ages are binding (for in-
stance, in low-income regions or in age groups 
like younger workers) they destroy jobs and 
cause unemployment. Minimum wages are at the 
root of youth unemployment. Do not declare 
negotiated wages mandatory. 
Redefine the reservation wage in Continental 
countries that is determined by the social security 
systems. Unemployment benefits5 and social 
welfare payments define a reservation wage that 
determines search behavior in the labor market 
and preparedness to accept a job. Empirical ana-
lysis of the unemployed (in Germany) shows that 
the reservation wage is at 1.2 of the previous 
wage when employed. The reservation wage pre-
vents wage differentiation in the lower labor 
market segment.  
The alternative to the approach of adjusting 
the reservation wage downward is to pay a wage 
subsidy, i.e., to bridge the gap between the (low) 
____________________
5 In Germany, in two schemes, Arbeitslosenhilfe being paid 
with no time limit after Arbeitslosengeld is terminated. 
productivity of the worker and the (higher) 
wanted wage ( the reservation wage) by a gov-
ernmental subsidy. I am extremely skeptical 
about this approach. First, the approach hinges 
on the level of the reservation wage provided by 
the governmental systems. If the reservation 
wage is high, high subsidies would be required. 
Second, empirical results of pilot projects (in 
Germany) show a rather limited employment 
effect. Limited overall employment effects are 
also observed in the case of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit in the United States and for the 
Working Families Tax Credit in the United 
Kingdom (both, however, with positive employ-
ment results for single parents and for parents 
with children). Third, a wage subsidy presup-
poses that the trade unions not be induced to 
make higher wage demands, since the wage sub-
sidy would take care of those in the lower seg-
ment in the labor market. Fourth, the costs for 
this program would be sizable if it were applied 
widely; if, however, the program were not ap-
plied widely, stigmatization effects might arise. 
Fifth, a new form of a subsidy would be intro-
duced. The reservation wage and the level of the 
subsidy are political variables that would be like-
ly to rise in the mechanics of the political process 
over time. It is likely that, in the political pro-
cess, subsidies and the reservation would move 
up. Sixth, the assignment of responsibilities 
would change. The government takes over the 
responsibility from the trade unions for employ-
ment in the lower segment of the labor market.  
9. Subsidies require sizable financial resources 
(in Germany, 8 percent of GDP if a broad con-
cept of subsidies is applied) and imply distor-
tions and efficiency losses. They tend to protect 
and favor old sectors and they impede structural 
change. Subsidies should be done away with.  
Take a Long-Run View of the Conflict 
between Equity and Efficiency 
10. Equity and social cohesion cannot be defined 
as job protection for those employed at the cost 
of discriminating the unemployed. Unemploy-
ment is social exclusion. Equity cannot be equity 8 
in a static context for mainly those of today. We 
should interpret distribution and social equity in 
an intertemporal sense and not put too much 
weight on short-term social equity. Instead, we 
should look at the question whether income per 
capita will improve in the medium run, and we 
should look at vertical mobility in the income 
distribution over five or more years. According 
to empirical studies, vertical income mobility is a 
relevant fact.6 We should take a longer-run view 
of distribution and social equity. Growth can 
improve the situation for most of the people. The 
political task is to develop a win-win situation in 
which benefits are spread out widely.7 
There is a conflict between dynamics and 
social cohesion. Partly, this conflict may be over-
come by approaches such as raising labor pro-
ductivity and using productivity increases from 
more flexibility in working time. But, in essence, 
there is a choice between more dynamics and 
more cohesion. The EU has to be realistic 
enough to acknowledge this conflict. 
Reduce the Role of the Status Quo – Rely 
on Competition  
11. Economic policy must shift its orientation 
away from the short run and take a longer-run 
view. Adhocery, a quick fix of political pro-
blems, and a populist short-run reaction to sud-
den issues imply that side-effects in a general 
equilibrium and long-run effects over time are 
neglected. Very often, short-run fixes are at the 
cost of long-run negative implications. Unfortu-
nately, the media require extremely simple and 
naïve ideas that can be understood in thirty 
seconds. Nevertheless, the long-run impact has to 
be taken into account. Sustainability of public 
finances is an example. This is first of all an issue 
of economic policy orientation, in the words of 
Churchill: “A politician always thinks of the next 
election, a statesman considers the next gener-
____________________
6 In West Germany, 54.1 percent of those below 50 percent 
of the median income in 1995 were in a higher relative 
income position after four years. See Sachverständigenrat 
(2000: Table 69). 
7 Profit sharing is a relevant strategy. 
ation.” We need institutional rules that have to be 
followed and institutional safeguards so that 
intertemporal restraints are not violated. These 
may be constitutional constraints in each coun-
try, for instance, on the permissible level of new 
public debt or rules such as the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  
12. Growth means change; it transforms soci-
ety. But mature economies are characterized by 
structural rigidities. Japan is a case in point. Ri-
gidities are also a problem for Europe. The status 
quo plays an important role in economic policy 
making. Traditional sectors like agriculture are 
protected. Income distribution is influenced by 
the status quo. Wage negotiations favor the em-
ployed, not the unemployed. Trade unions maxi-
mize the income of their members. Vested inter-
ests are politically organized. University systems 
cannot be opened to competition. The consensus 
approach favors the existing power structure. 
Member states of the EU define their political 
interest from their status quo. All this causes 
inertia, which is an impediment for change, a 
barrier to innovation, a hurdle for economic dy-
namics and growth. Institutional innovation is 
lacking in Europe. It is the task of political 
leadership to open the way to overcome the 
status quo and to set in motion a process that will 
eventually modernize societies.  
13. An important mechanism to overcome the 
status quo is an open economy. Protectionism is 
not a viable alternative, as it implies lower gains 
from trade. It would mean lower welfare for the 
countries of the world. Harmonizing labor norms 
worldwide is a protectionist instrument for the 
industrialized countries, but it would restrict the 
economic opportunities for the developing coun-
tries. Therefore, one should not give in to the 
illusionary requests of the NGOs. The failure of 
the Seattle Meeting was deplorable in the context 
of a growth strategy for the world economy. 
After the terror attacks of September 11, it is 
especially important to develop the WTO further 
in order to reduce uncertainties. The role of the 
EU in the Doha Round should not be defensive, 
the intention being to continue agricultural pro-
tection and protect the status quo. The EU should 
take a much more active role in enhancing the 
world trade order.  9 
14. A very serious risk for the EU is that 
after  enlargement the institutional arrangement 
of decision-making will no longer be appropri-
ate. The voting scheme established by the Nice 
Treaty will make it difficult to reach decisions in 
important areas. There is a risk that the EU will 
block itself in its decision making and that the 
status quo will play an even larger role (Siebert 
2002). Thus, a new voting scheme is a prerequi-
site to prevent stagnation in the EU. 
15. Europe is at a crossroads. It needs a new 
policy orientation in favor of dynamics, growth 
and employment. It needs a sea change in its 
policy orientation, similar to France’s change to 
stability orientation in 1983. This is an issue of 
political leadership. Ideas already expressed in 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (Euro-
pean Commission 1999) and the Presidency Con-
clusions at Lisbon (European Commission 2000) 
should be implemented.  
Some Adverse Conditions 
16. The question of how to reach a higher growth 
path is especially relevant for the EU, since the 
major Continental countries will be characterized 
by a sizable aging of their population. This will 
mean less economic dynamics (Siebert 2001). 
Moreover, the global environmental constraint 
may prove to be an impediment to growth that 
has to be tackled. Finally, it cannot be ruled out 
that there will be a third energy crisis in the long 
run.  
Eight Points for the Next Five Years  
17. Within the next five years, the larger Con-
tinental member states of the EU should shift 
their policy orientation in favor of economic 
dynamics and growth by 
•  relying on competition to enhance dynamic 
performance,  
•  establishing an innovation-friendly environ-
ment,  
•  strengthening human capital formation,  
•  reducing the size of government, 
•  cutting subsidies in half, 
•  reducing marginal tax and contribution rates, 
•  relying on wage moderation in countries where 
unemployment is high, and 
•  deregulating the labor market to allow a more 
decentralized wage formation in firms. 
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